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Taxation-Depreciation and Inclusion in Equity Invested CapitalAssets Transferred to Attract Industry
Transfers of property and cash from community and civic groups
have become a common method of inducing industry to locate and do
business in areas seeking to progress industrially and commercially.
Even courts adopting a stringent view of these transfers for the purpose
of settling connected taxation questions do not deny the validity and
necessity of supporting them legally. Such transfers benefit both the
transferor, by improving the community financially, and the transferee,
by easing the burden of organization and location expenses.
Recently, in Brown Shoe Company v. Commissioner,1 the United
States Supreme Court clarified its position in regard to tax problems
arising from these transfers. Petitioner, pursuant to the terms of written contracts, had received land, cash, and buildings and equipment
from civic groups in twelve communities, and had agreed to perform
various promises in return, e.g., enlarging existing plants, or building
new ones, and maintaining them at minimum payrolls for a stipulated
numbers of years. Only one transaction, a donation of $10,000 cash
for "organization expenses," was without any contractual basis. In
every instance where cash was involved, the cash received was less than
the outlay required to perform the contract. Two problems were presented by these transfers: First, whether the company could dleduct
depreciation on buildings transferred and on buildings and equipment
acquired or enlarged with cash received; and second, whether the company could include in its equity invested capital credit for purposes
of excess profits taxation the total amount of cash and property contributed.2 The court allowed both the deduction for depreciation and
the inclusion in equity invested capital.
This decision eliminated a trend in the cases which had been a matter
of concern to businessmen and the accounting profession since the decision of Detroit Edison Company v. Commissioner.3 The Detroit
Edison Company had charged its consumers for the cost of extending
170
Sup. Ct. 820 (1950).
2
The 1940 excess profits tax, which had much in common with prior excess
profits taxes, was aimed only at swollen profits which are caused by wartime
conditions. Two bases for applying the tax were provided, after a specific exemption of $5,000. First, the taxpayer could deduct from the net income, subject
to the ordinary income tax, the average of earnings for a given base period. Or it
could take as a credit an amount equal to eight percent of its invested capital.
In other words, Congress evidently considered a return of eight percent on invested capital a fair return under normal business conditions. It is obvious that
if the latter basis is used, it is to the taxpayer's advantage to include as much
as it could in invested capital, since the amount of the tax is in inverse propor-

tion to the size of invested capital. The 1940 tax was repealed in 1945, but in

view of present world conditions that or a similar tax may once again be imposed. RzvxxuE Acr oF 1940, 201, 54 STAT. 975 (1940).

'319 U. S. 98 (1942).
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electric current distribution facilities and claimed as a base for computing its depreciation the full cost of the installations. 4 The Court
decided that the funds were neither a gift nor a contribution to capital,
and the company was denied depreciation on that portion of the cost
which it had shifted to its consumers.
Nothing in the Detroit Edison Company case should alarm a taxpayer who happened to be involved in the kind of transactions which
were under consideration in the Brown Shoe Company case, because
the situations are totally different. The funds received by the Detroit
Edison Company were payments for service which would directly benefit
the one making the payments. In no sense could it be contended that
the purpose of the payments was to enlarge the capital of the company; while this was the desired result of the transactions in the
Brown Shoe Company case. The only benefit to the civic groups was
that which might ultimately arise from the financial betterment of the
community. Only indirectly would there be any form of compensation
for the funds expended. 5
The disconcerting element, before the distinction made by the Court
in the Brown Shoe Company case became binding upon all circuits, was
that the Tax Court had considered itself bound by the Detroit Edison
Company decision in the Brown Shoe Company case,8 in McKay Products Corporationv. Commissioner,7 and in Downey v. Commissioner.8
It disallowed both depreciation and inclusion in invested capital. The
Tax Court was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the
McKay case,0 but was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the Brown Shoe Company case 0 and the Downey case. 1' This conflict was the basis for the Court's granting certiorari in the Brown Shoe
Company case.12 Had the Court chosen to adopt the view of the Eighth
Circuit, an immediate result would have been the diminution in value
of such transfers to the transferee, and possibly to the transferor, who
might finally be forced to make up the difference. However, the Court's
adoption of the view of the Third Circuit has limited the Detroit Edison
Company case to its factual context, and the way is now clear for the
full realization of the value to be derived.
An analysis of the factors and theories involved in these decisions
discloses three major divisions of approaches to the problem of invested
capital. One approach may properly be termed the "purchase" theory.
' INT. Rv. CODE §§113(a) (2), 113(a) (8) (B).
and in McKay Products
' This distinction is utilized in both the principal case
Corporation v. Commissioner, 178 F. 2d 639 (3rd Cir. 1949).
"9 T. C. 1082 (1947).
6 10 T. C. 291 (1948).
'178 F. 2d 639 (3rd Cir. 1949).
8 10 T. C. 837 (1948).
10 175 F. 2d 305 (8th Cir. 1949).
1' 70

Sup. Ct. 820 (1950).

172 F. 2d 810 (8th Cir. 1949).
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Under this theory, the consideration furnished by the company for the
transfer is regarded as payment for the property. Accordingly, the
property could not be considered invested capital, any more than the
general assets could be. This approach overlooks the intent of the
framers of the 1940 Excess Profits Tax Act.1 3 In comparing this
statute with the previous act of 1917,14 it will be noted that the italicized
words were added: "The equity invested capital . . . shall be the sum
of the following amounts, reduced as provided in subsection (b) . . .
(2) . . . Property (other than money) previously paid in (regardless
of the time paid in) for stock, or as paid-in surplus, or as a contribution
to capital."' 5 Congress probably thus indicated an intention to adopt
the view that invested capital was no longer to be confined to funds
received from persons with a proprietary interest in the company, because such funds were already includible as paid-in surplus. 16 In the
Brown Shoe Company case the point is made that such assets are adIditions to "capital" as that term has long been understood in business and
accounting practice. 17
The second approach is the "gift" theory. It is based upon the
concept that the transaction between the transferor and the transferee
is a "gift subject to a condition."' 8 To support this classification it has
been urged that the bargain element is lacking, and that the transferor
is saying, in effect, "Move here, and we will give you valuable property." (Emphasis supplied.)1 While such an interpretation may be
very desirable to a promisor wishing to avoid legal liability, if followed
to its logical conclusion it would have a company spending large sums
to locate and build a plant on the mere chance that it will receive a
"gift" of land or other property, subject to the whim or caprice of the
promisor. While it is useless to argue intent without a given situation,
it will suffice to point out that the usual profitable, desirable business
enterprise could hardly be supposed to have based such a substantial
expenditure of the stockholders' funds on the hazards of a promise
which is legally unenforceable. If the reply is made that the gift is to
occur before the outlay, then it will forever remain in the realm of
speculation as to how this "Alphonse and Gaston" routine will end: one
" REVENUE ACT OF 1940, §201, 54 STAT. 975 (1940).
1, REVENUE Acr OF 1917, §200, 39 STAT. 1000 (1917).
" RnNUE AcT OF 1940, §201, 54 STAT. 975 (1940).
1"

One case where funds contributed by stockholders would be neither money

paid in for stock nor paid-in surplus would arise where stockholders contribute
funds to erase a capital deficit. But in view of the broad language used in adding
to the definition of invested capital in the statute, it can hardly be supposed that

Congress intended so narrowly to restrict the addition. Such restrictive language
could easily have been inserted instead of the inclusive phrase, "contributions to
capital."
"770 Sup. Ct. 820, 823 (1950).
" 27 TAxEs 741, 744 (1949).

27

TAxEs

741 (1949).
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party saying, "After you give, Alphonse"; the other saying, "After you
move, Gaston." It cannot be denied that only two interpretations are
reasonable. Either there is a bilateral contract, with the company
promising to move, build, and maintain the plant for a certain period
at a certain minimum payroll and the civic group promising to convey
the property; or there is a unilateral contract, which came into existence
upon the company's performance of the conditions contained in the
offer, i.e., moving and building. The former has the advantage of
greater probability. The gift theory seems insupportable when examined with regard to the intent of the parties and the rules of- contract
which govern their relations.
The recognition of an enforceable contract between the parties gives
rise to the third theory, which may be called the "contract-cost" theory.
This theory requires the inclusion of the assets in invested capital. It
recognizes the obvious fact that there is "cost" to the taxpayer, in that
there is an expenditure consequent upon performance of that contract.
But the fact that the assets "cost" the taxpayer does not prevent their
being invested capital any more than the issuance of stock keeps the
funds paid in from being so regarded. It is true that the contributor
of the assets may profit, even if only remotely, but so may the purchaser of stock through the increase in value of the stock.
The "contract-cost" theory has the best of the legal logic. It says,
in effect, "Of course there is 'cost' to the taxpayer, but that does not
prevent the assets from being 'contributions to capital,' since the intent
of the parties was that they be such, and since there is no inherent
reason why 'contributions to capital' may not arise from a contract.
The application of this theory is unnecessary to resolve the inclusion
in invested capital of cash or property truly donated, as was one of the
amounts in the Brown Shoe Company case, since there is no problem
of actual cost to the taxpayer. If the premise that "contributions" to
capital may originate from outside the business is conceded, then the
conclusion is inescapable that the term "contribution" includes by its
plain meaning genuine gifts, be they cash or property.
As to depreciation, the irreconcilable decisions of the courts simply
reflect the deeply rooted conflict over the true nature of depreciation.
This conflict transcends legal considerations, and has long been a matter
of controversy among accountants, businessmen, and scholars. The
older school of thought regards 'depreciation's true function as the
charging off of the original investment; in other words, the "return of
the investment." The newer viewpoint is that depreciation allowances
are made to provide for the replacement of the asset, leaving the original
investment as representative of the equity of the original stockholders.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

Fortune, in the guise of an enlightened Congress, has saved the courts
from the necessity of having to adopt either viewpoint as correct. In
providing for a corporation income tax, Congress clearly indicated
that the replacement theory should be used. Only this interpretation
can explain the provisions for a substituted depreciation basis in certain
situations. That is, in cases where depreciation clearly should be
allowed, as in the case of a gift or donation, but no actual cost basis
exists, the donee-taxpayer is allowed to use the basis of the donor,
limited to the fair market value at the time of the transfer. 20 If Congress had intended the older view of depreciation to prevail, the taxpayer would be held to a strict cost basis, and having no cost, would
be denied depreciation in many instances where his right to take it is
undisputed today. In the light of this conclusion, how realistic is the
argument that depreciation should be denied because there is no ascertainable cost to the taxpayer?
No distinction should be made taxwise between property acquired
,lirectly and property purchased with funds acquired. In each instance
the Brown Shoe Company was required to perform certain obligations
concerning the property, thus plainly contemplating that the company
already owned such property, or would purchase it with the funds
acquired, or would receive it by the terms of the contract. Any distinction made merely goes to the form of the transaction, and not to
its substance. If this distinction were permitted to effect a different
treatment from a tax standpoint, the only result would be a change in
the form of all subsequent transactions. Such a result would benefit
neither the government nor the taxpayer.
The Court in the Brown Shoe Company case adopts a liberal attitude
in allowing depreciation on the assets and their inclusion in equity invested capital. The type of transaction involved serves a useful purpose
in community development, and this helpful attitude on the part of the
Court should go far in preserving the value of such transactions for
both the community and the industries which it seeks to attract.
HARPER JOHNSTON ELAM, III.
Taxation-Exempt Organizations-Income Derived from
Unrelated Business
Under §101 of the Internal Revenue Code certain organizations
have been granted exemption from the income tax. These exemptions
remained substantially unchanged from the original Act of 1913,1 until
the Revenue Act of 19502 During the interim an increasing number
2* IxT. Rmv. COD

§113(a) (2).

138 STAT. 166 (1913).
'Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. §301 (Sept. 23, 1950).

